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STATE BUY-AMERICAN STATUTES: THEIR RELATION TO THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
The rising concern in the United States over the effect of low priced
foreign goods entering the domestic market-has caused new waves of pro-
tectionist feelings to sweep across the nation1 and has aroused new interest
in certain non-tariff controls.' One of these controls is the use of govern-
ment procurement policies which discriminate against foreign goods.
Often called "buy-American" or "buy-local" statutes, these regulations
force procurement officials and bidders on government contracts to give
preference to American made goods, a practice often resulting in increased
cost to the public.'
The model for many of the state buy-American statutes was the federal
act4 passed in 1933 as an anti-depression measure. The original purpose
of the statute was to combat rampant unemployment,5 to assure that do-
mestic and not German manufacturers won the valuable contract for the
constructioaf of heavy electrical equipment for the Hoover dam," and to
retaliate for the "buy-British" movement in England.' The statute covers
the purchase of articles and supplies by, and the construction of public
buildings or works for, the federal government. Although there have
been attempts to repeal the act,8 and legal writings urging such repeal,'
protectionist factors in Congress have been successful in thwarting such
efforts.
The state and local buy-American policies, more vulnerable to legal
attacks than the federal act, are of more immediate interest. These poli-
des are embodied in various forms ranging from state and local statutes'0
to administrative regulations and informal policies. 1 They consist of every-
1 See N.Y. Times, January 17, 1971, Sec. IV, at 14 ,col. 5.
2 See Matthews, Non-Tariff Import Restrictions: Remedies Available in United States Law,
62 MIcH. L. REv. 1295 (1963), for a complete discussion of non-tariff import restrictions.
3 See, e.g., HwAII REV. STAT. § 103-24 (1968) "In all expenditures of public money for
any public work or in the purchase of materials or supplies, preference shall be given to American
products, materials and supplies." Also see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-2 (Supp. 1962); 61 OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 51 (1963); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 639 (Purdons 1962).
4U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-10(d) (1965).
5 76 CONG. REC 2985, 3254 (1933).
6 76 CONG. REC. 3175, 3178, 3253 (1933).
7 76 CONG. REC. 3175 (1933). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the fed-
eral buy-American act see Gantt and Speck, Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal
Government Contraxting: Buy American Act and Executive Order, 7 J. PUB. L. 378 (1958).
8 COmIssIoN ON FOREIGN EcoNoMIc POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CON-
GRESS, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), also found in H.R. Doc. No. 220, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
9 Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1961).
10 See note 3 supra.
11 For an example of an administrative buy-American regulation, see Minute Order No.
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thing from complete prohibition of the use of foreign goods and discrim-
inatory licensing, labeling and inspection regulations to policies favoring
American goods if all other factors are equal.' 2 A 1963 survey revealed
that about one-third of the responding states restricted their purchase of
foreign goods by either statute or policy.13
Recently, state and local buy-American policies have come under at-
tack by foreign interests, especially in the steel industry.' 4 Generally
these attacks are based on two arguments: (1) that state and local buy-
American statutes violate Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 5 and (2) that they constitute an intrusion into the
foreign affairs and the commerce powers reserved by the Constitution to
the federal government. It is the purpose of this note to examine the sub-
stance of these arguments.
I. STATE "BUY-AMERICAN" STATUTES AND GATT
A. The Problem
The state buy-American statutes appear to be in conflict with at least
one provision of the GATT, that being Article III, Paragraph 4 of Part II:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in re-
spect of all laws regulations requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use . . .1
The supporters of the buy-American statutes argue that GATT is not
intended to be applicable to the states at all, but only to the fedeal gov-
ernment. In support of this position they point to Article XXIV, Para-
graph 12, of Part II:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be avail-
able to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the
regional and local government and authorities within its territory.' 7
48,644 by the Texas Highway Commission which was the subject of Texas Highway Com'n v.
Texas Ass'n, of Steel Imp., Inc., 372 S.W. 525 (Tex. 1963).
12 For an example of discriminatory licensing see City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio
Op. 2d 331, 195 N..2d 916 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1963); and City of Columbus v.
Miqadasi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Franklin County Mun. Ct 1963).
1 3 National Association of State Purchasing Officials Committee on Competition in Govern-
ment Purchasing, 1963 Survey on In-State Preference Practices, Domestic vs. Foreign Purchases
(available from NASPO, 1313 East 60th St., Chicago, Illinois 60637, portions reproduced in
Note, 32 GEo. WASH. L. 2RiV. 584, 608 (1964)).
14 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 275 Cal. App.2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr.
800 (Ct. App. 1969); American Institute for Imported Steel v. County of Brie, 58 Misc. 2d 1059,
297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Erie Co. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y.S. 60 (1969).
15 61 Stat. pt. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
16Id. at A19.
'7 61 Stat pt. 5, A67-68, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
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They further argue that regardless of the applicability of GATT to the
state statutes generally, the buy-American statutes, most of which were in
effect before GATT became applicable, are not affected by the Agreement
because of Section I of the Protocol of Provisional Applications,' the
document which officially adopted GATT. Section I provides that GATT
is to be applied "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing regu-
lations."'19
Finally, the proponents of the state buy-American statutes maintain
that even if GATT is applicable to the state laws, the "escape clause" of
Article III exempts them. Article III, Paragraph 8(a) of Part II states:
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or
requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial resale 20
In order to determine the validity of these arguments four areas must
be examined:
(1) The role of GATT in United States law.
(2) The meaning of the "existing legislation" clause.
(3) Whether GATT is the "supreme law of the land."
(4) The applicability of the "government purchase exception."
B. GATT as United States Law
During the negotiations relating to the formation of the International
Trade Organization (ITO), a body which was to be formed under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council,21 GATT came
into being. The intent of the draftsmen was that GATT would be a tern.-
porary agreement, valid only until the ITO charter was properly framed
and ratified by the member states. The United States received the draft
ITO charter in April, 1949,22 but Congress never voted on the matter. In
December of 1950, the State Department announced that the charter would
not be resubmitted to Congress. 3  Thus, while the ITO charter was never
put into effect, the supposedly temporary GATT remains even today.
18 61 Star. pt 6, A 2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
19Id.
20 Supra, note 17.
21 See Hearings on Trade Agreement System and Proposed International Trade Organiza-
tion Charter before The Senate Committee of Finance, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 55 (1947); U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, Preparatory Committee, Report of the First Session,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (1947) Annexure 10; U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Pre-
paratory Committee, Report of the Darfting Committee, U.N. Doc. B/PC/T/34 Rev.1 (1947)
Pt. III.
22 S. Doc. No. 61, H.R. Doc. No. 168, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
22S. Doc. No. 61, H.R. Doc. No. 168, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
2323 DEP'T STATE BULL. 977 (1950).
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The actual completion of the GATT negotiations took place in Geneva
on October 30, 1947, and it was put into effect by the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application,24 an executive agreement entered into by the President.
The authority of the President to enter this agreement has been said to
be derived from one of two sources: either the delegation of Congres-
sional authority through the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934,25 or the broad
powers of the President in the area of foreign relations.28  Attacks on the
power of the Congress to delegate authority to the President under the
Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 have been unsuccessful in the past and are
not likely to succeed in the future. m  Attacks based on the premise that
GATT oversteps the authority delegated to the President are more sub-
stantial, but as will be seen, are also likely to fail.
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act gives the President the power
to "enter into foreign trade agreements" and "to proclaim such modifica-
tions of existing duties and other import restrictions .... as are required
or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement" provided "no
proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than 50 per
centum any existing rate of duty or transferring any article between duti-
able and free lists .... - It has been said that the first clause gives the
President unlimited power to enter into any agreement which might rea-
sonably be termed a foreign trade agreement. 9 However, the area of
"foreign trade agreements" so defined might encompass a variety of matters
fairly far afield of the original subject. It is the argument of the sup-
porters of the state buy-American statutes that GATT is such a matter.
Supporters of the state buy-American statutes further argue that the
"unlimited" interpretation would have the effect of allowing the President
to bind the United States internationally to any "foreign trade agreement"
he may wish to enter without necessarily giving him the means to imple-
ment the policy domestically." At least one writer has pointed out that
24 See note 18 supra.
2548 Star. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351 (1958). This authority has been
continued over the years: 57 Stat. 125 (1943); 59 Star. 410 (1945); 63 Star. 698 (1949); 69
Star. 162 (1955); 72 Star. 673 (1958); 76 Stat. 872 (1962). For sources referring to this
statute as authority for the president to enter GATT, see 94 CoNG. REc. 12662 (1949).
26 See H.R. Rep. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1955); Hearings on Extension of the
Trade Agreements Act Before The Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1153 (1951);
Hearings on the Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before The Senate Finance
Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1949); Statement by the Legal Advisor to the State Depart-
ment, reprinted in Hearings on Trade Agreement System and Proposed International Trade
Organization Charter Before the Senate Committee of Finance, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-87
(1947).
27 Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. U.S., 275 F.2d 473 (1959). See Hampton & Co. v. U.S., 276
U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) upholding similar statutes. See also.
Jackson, GATT in U.S. Domestic Law, 66 MIcFL L. REv. 249, 257 (1967).
2848 Stat. 943-44 (1934).
20 Memorandum of the Department of State, printed in H.R. Rep. No. 2007, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 113 (1956).
30 Jackson, GAAT in U.S. Domestic Law, 66 Mic, L. REv. 249, 261 (1967).
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for this reason it would be more efficacious to read the term "trade agree-
ment" as being limited by the second dause.3 1 Thus, a "trade agreement"
would have to be related to "duties and import restrictions." This reading
would result in the President's being able to enter only those agreements
which he could carry out domestically through his limited powers of pro-
damation.32
Clearly, even with this narrow reading of the term "trade agreements,"
Article III, paragraph 4 qualifies because it relates to import restrictions.
Further, the proclamation of the President necessary to give a foreign trade
agreement the force of domestic law was made in respect to Article III,
paragraph 433 Thus if the President's power to enter GATT is based
on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, it is very likely valid.
Resting the presidential authority on the broad powers of the execu-
tive to regulate foreign affairs is more questionable. Although there are
precedents for the use of executive agreements in the area of foreign com-
merce,34 they are limited. One United States court of appeals held that
an executive agreement with Canada relating to the importation of seed
potatoes was invalid because the power to regulate foreign commerce is
vested in the legislature and not the executive branch.3"
While it is still possible to argue the invalidity of GATT, or portions
of GATT, under United States law, the fact that GATT now forms the
general framework for all foreign trade weighs heavily against the pos-
sibility of a court's striking down the entire agreement.
C. The "Existing Legislai'ion" Exception
Assuming that GATT is a valid executive agreement, it is necessary to
determine whether it supercedes state legislation. It is an accepted prin-
ciple that self-executing agreements are superior to state legislation exist-
ing at the time of the making of the agreement .3  GATT, however, is
somewhat different. It is domestic law by virtue of its having been pro-
claimed by the President. in the announcement proclaiming GATT in
force, President Truman used the words of the Protocol of Provisional Ap-
plication 7 saying that the United States would apply provisionally after
31 Id.
82 For a discussion of how a proclamation has the effect of domestic law, see id. at 282-290.
83 Presidential Proclamation No. 2761A, 3 C.FR. 139 (Supp. 1947).
34 See, Hearings on the Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before The Sen-
ate Finance Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-54 (1949).
35 United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1954). At page 658 the court states:
The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not the executive or the
courts; and the executive may not exercise the power by entering into executive agre-
ments and suing in the courts ....
3 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
87 61 Star, pt.6, A2051 (1947); 55 UN.T.S. 308 (1950).
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January 1, 1948 "(a) parts I and III of said general agreement and (b)
part II thereof to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legisla-
tion.""8 If "existing legislation" includes state legislation then most state
buy-American statutes are exempt from Article III, Paragraph 4 which
falls under Part II of GATT.
Those who are opposed to the notion that the term "existing legisla-
tion" includes state legislation point to the legislative history of GATT as
support for their position. The clause, originally in the text of GATT"
and later moved to the Protocol, 40 was necessary in order that GATT
could expeditiously be put into operation. This was so because a large
number of delegations possessed only the power to agree on tariffs, the
non-tariff portion of the agreement (Part II) requiring passage by their
respective legislatures. Thus it would seem that the draftsmen of GATT
only intended to exempt from coverage those matters over which execu-
tives did not have power and therefore to which the delegations could not
agree. Since an executive agreement in the United States is superior to
inconsistent state law, the argument goes, the executive could agree to Part
II without any legislative action and therefore United States state laws
should not fall under the category "existing legislation" for Part II pur-
poses.
Further support for this position comes from the view held by the
United States government. In 1951, the State Department officials taking
part in the GATT negotiations prepared a memorandum of inconsistent
existing legislation which would have to be repealed in which they did not
mention any state laws.41 Later, a similar list was presented to GATT and
was likewise devoid of any state law.42  These omissions could be inter-
preted to indicate that the United States government never considered
state laws as falling under the category "existing legislation." On the
other hand, the argument is sometimes made that state legislation was not
included in the memorandum to Congress because Congress was only con-
cerned with the federal laws it would have to repeal.43 However, that
does not serve to explain the later report to GATT. The argument is quite
strong that "existing legislation" means only "existing federal legislation."
D. The "Local Government" Clause
This area of the law is further complicated by the existence of Article
XXIV, Paragraph 12, of Part II:
38Supra note 33.
39 U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/135, at 9 (July 24, 1947).
40 U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/196 (Sept. 13, 1947).
41 Hearings opn Extension of the Trade Agreements Act Before The Senate Finance Comm.,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1195 (1951).
4 2 GA7T Doc. L/2375/Add. 1 at 17 (1965), reproducing L/309/Add. 1 and 2 (1955).
43 See GAT, The California Buy American Act, and the Continuing Struggle Between Free
Trade and Protectionism, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 341 (1964).
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Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be avail-
able to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this agreement by the
regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.44
There are at least two interpretations of this Article leading to different
results vis-i-vis GATT's superiority to state law. One interpretation is
that the national governments were required only to take "reasonable mea-
sures" to try to persuade their political subdivisions to abide by GATT,
even if the national government had the legal authority to require its sub-
divisions to comply. Thus, assuming these "reasonable measures," mean-
ing persuasion, were taken, the national government could not be held in-
ternationally liable for breaches of GATT by its subdivisions. This inter-
pretation leads to the conclusion that GATT was not meant to override in-
consistent state legislation.
The position that "reasonable measures" means "persuasion" is sup-
portable by several past constructions. In a letter from the State Depart-
ment to the Attorney General of Hawaii in 1957, Mr. Herman Phlegar,
the State Department legal advisor said:
This provision (Article XXIV, Paragraph 12, of GATT) was added
because under the constitutions of some contracting parties international
agreements cannot have the effect of overriding and invalidating incon-
sistent state legislation of their political subdivisions. It has always been
interpreted as preventing the General Agreement from overriding legisla-
tion of political subdivisions of contracting parties inconsistent with the
provisions of the agreement; by placing upon contracting parties the obli-
gation to take reasonable measures to obtain observance of the agreement
by such subdivisions. The parties indicated that as a matter of law the
General Agreement did not override such laws.45
Further support for this position is found in the testimony of a State
Department official to a senate committee in 1949:
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Well, with reference to that, what can we do
about it? Supposing any of our states within their proper constitutional
authority put up a tax that is inconsistent with the provisions of this arti-
cle which we have been discussing? What is our obligation?
Mr. BROWN. I do not think we could do anything about it, Senator.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Have we promised, or held out an implied
promise, to do something that we could do anything about it?
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Let us read that.
44 61 Stat., pt.5,. A1, A 67, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1947).
4 5 Letter from Herman Phleger, Department of State Legal Advisor, to Richard Sharpless,
Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, Feb. 26, 1957, cited in 12 STANFORD L. REV. 355 at 373
n.3; Jackson, supra note 30 at 303, n.288. This letter is on file in the Department of the At-
torney General of Hawaii, as contained and certified in an affidavit of April 5, 1967, by Burt
T Kobayashi, Attorney General of Hawaii. It was filed by the attorneys for the plaintiff in
Bethelehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Commissioners, supra note 14.
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Mr. BROWN. Let me just check.
The only commitment that we have taken, on that point, Senator, is in the
last paragraph of Article XXIV, page 82.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Article XXIV of GATT?
Mr. BROWN. Article XXIV of the general agreement; yes. Because it
was recognized that the Federal Government did not have the power to
compel action by the local government. It only had powers of persuasion.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Well, can we accept it as beyond "if's," "buts,"
"maybe's" that it is not intended that the Federal Government shall at-
tempt to conform State Laws by any method whatsoever, to the provisions
of this agreement?
Mr. BROWN. That may be taken categorically, but that does not mean
that the Federal Government might not get in touch with a governor and
suggest to him that he consider a course of action which the State is
following has certain effects. But that would be simply a matter of per-
suasion and consultation.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Would the provisions of this article or any
part of GATT impose upon the Federal Government any duties to do any-
thing as to local State laws or movements, which are intended to promote
State products, such as "Buy Georgia Peaches," "Buy Colorado Cataloups,"
state advertising campaigns out of public funds to promote those local buy-
ing movements?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Is there anything in this agreement any place
that imposes any obligation on the Federal Government to stop anything
of that sort?
Mr. BROWN. I don't think so, sir.
SENATOR MILLIKIN. Is there any question about it?
Mr. BROWN. No; I don't know of anything. It was not intended. 46
The other interpretations of this artide rest on the premise that it
was designed to apply to only those nations which could not legally
force their subdivisions to comply with GATT. Using this interpretation
the words "reasonable measures" take on the meaning "require if legally
possible." Since the United States does have the power to require its states
to abide by GATT, it is obligated to do so. This reading would indicate
GATT was intended to override inconsistent state legislation. Legisla-
tive history adds support to the "require if legally possible" interpreta-
tion. When, during the negotiations relating to GATT, it was suggested
that Article XXIV, Paragraph 12, be deleted, a United States delegate op-
posed the idea stating:
This particular paragraph was drawn from the [ITO] Charter, and I think
some rather careful consideration went into its framing. I believe it is
46 Hearings on the Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act before The Senate Comm.,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. pt.2 at 1161-62 (1949). It has been suggested that this witness was delib-
erately downgrading the scope of GATT as a result of political opposition to ITO and GATT
by the members of the committee. See Jackson, supra note 30 at 308.
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necessary to distinguish between central or federal governments, which
undertake these obligations in a firm way, and local authorities, which are
not strictly bound, so to speak, by the provisions of the agreement, de-
pending of course on the constitutional procedure of the country con-
cerned.47
One other factor must be taken into consideration when trying to de,
termine the meaning of Article XXIV, Paragraph 12; that is a note to
Article III, Paragraph 1, found in Annex I to GATT.
The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local govern-
ments and authorities within the territory of a contracting party is subject
to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article XXIV. The term "rea-
sonable measures" in the last-mentioned paragraph would not require,
for example, the repeal of existing national legislation authorizing local
governments to impose internal taxes which, although technically incon-
sistent with the letter of Article III, are not in fact inconsistent with its
spirit, if such repeal would result in a serious financial hardship for the
local governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by
local governments or authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter
and spirit of Article III, the term "reasonable measures" would permit a
contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a
transition period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and
financial difficulties. 48
Although at least one writer insists that the history of this note indi-
cates that it was not intended to affect the language of Article XXIV,
Paragraph 12," on its face it appears that the interpretation of "reasonable
measures" as not requiring the immediate overriding of a state law indi-
cates that GATT was not to apply to state law.
There are plausable arguments on each side of the question whether
GATT supersedes state legislation. There are only a very few cases which
have addressed themselves in any degree to the problem, but they gener-
ally hold GATT to override state law.
In Territory v. Ho,5° the Supreme Court of Hawaii held a statute which
required sellers of foreign eggs to display identifying placards invalid be-
cause it discriminated against foreign goods, and was, therefore, incon-
sistent with Article III of GATT. The Court found that GATT was a
treaty for supremacy clause purposes. In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.
47 U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/PV/19 at 32-33 (1947). In a discussion of a similar provision in
the ITO Charter a U.S. delegate noted that the provision "applied to both central and local
government where the central government was traditionally or constitutionally able to control
the local government." He went on to say that he thought the U.S. government would be able
to control the actions of its states. (U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/27 at 1 (1946). An Australian
delegate noted that when his country's "external powers laws" do not give the central govern-
ment the authority to act and the matter is one solely of state action, there is no way to force the
states to act. (U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/13, at 1 (1946).
48 62 Stat., pt.3, at 3689-3690.
49 Jackson, supra note 30 at 307-308.
50 41 Hawaii 565 (1957).
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v. Superior Court,"' a California district court states in dicta that the Cal-
ifornia buy-American statute52 was unenforceable because it conflicted
with "certain treaties and agreements [referring to GATT, Artide III,
Paragraph 41 and thus the 'supreme law of the land.' "
In American Institute for Imported Steel v. County of Erie,54 however,
the Supreme Court for Erie County, New York, upheld a buy-American
resolution passed by the county legislature in connection with the con-
struction of the Erie County Health Center facility for school children.
Although the petitioner raised the subject of GATT, he did not rely heav-
ily on the agreement in his argument and the court dismissed this conten-
ion in two sentences:
It would appear from the foregoing provisions of GATT that they do not
in and of themselves supercede local legislation. In any event, peti-
tioners have not met their burden on this contention since it is the cour's
opinion that the GATT provisions are not here applicable.55
The American Institute for Imported Steel case is of little value in de-
termining whether GATT supercedes state law because the issue was not
actively litigated. The final decision of this matter will probably be in
keeping with Ho and Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton and be a result not of stat-
utory interpretation, but rather of the policy considerations to be discussed
below under the section on constitutional arguments.
E. The "Government Purchase" Exception
Even if it is established that GATT is constitutional and superior to
inconsistent state legislation, it is necessary to determine whether a spe-
cific buy-American statute, or a specific transaction under a buy-American
statute can be saved by Article III, Paragraph 8 (a) of Part II:
The provisions of this article shall not apply to laws, regulations or re-
quirements governing the procurement by government agencies of prod-
ucts purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to com-
mercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale.56
51208 Cal. App.2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1st Dist. 1962).
5 2 CAL. Gov'T CODB § 4303 (West 1966) states:
The governing body of any political subdivision, municipal corporation, or district,
and any public officer or person charged with the letting of contracts for (1) The con-
struction, alteration, or repair of public works or (2) for the purchasing of materials for
public use, shall let such contracts only to persons who agree to use or supply only such
unmanufactured materials as have been produced in the United States, and only such
manufactured materials as have been manufactured in the United States, substantially
all from materials produced in the United States.
53 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 at 808.
54 58 Misc.2d 1059, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Erie Co. 1968), rev'd on other gropunds, 32 A.D.2d
231, 302 N.Y.S. 61 (1969).
5d. at 1063-64, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
56 62 Star. pt.3, 3681.
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The problems in this area center around the questions: (1) What are
governmental purposes? (2) What is commercial resale? (3) What are
goods? and (4) What are products for use in the production of goods?
If the term "products purchased for governmental purposes" is nar-
rowly defined to include only items such as office equipment and construc-
tion materials for government buildings, then many of the public works
projects which fall under buy-American statutes would not be included!
in the exception and the states would be required to treat foreign goods
the same as American goods under Article III, Paragraph 4, of GATT.
The fact that the federal buy-American Act7 was not included in the
Senate list of inconsistent legislation,58 however, seems to be some evi-
dence that a broader reading was originally intended. If "government
purposes" was meant to have only a very narrow meaning, then the cov-
erage of all public buildings and works in the federal buy-American stat-
ute would remove it from the governmental purposes exception and it would
have been included in the Congressional list of inconsistent legislation.
In testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in 1947, Mr. John M.
Leddy, advisor to the Division of Commercial Policy, United States De-
partment of State, testified that the ITO provision analogous to GATT Ar-
ticle III, Paragraph 8 (a)5" (the governmental purposes exception) would
not affect the United States buy-American Act,6 thus giving further sup-
port for the broad interpretation position. While the use of the phrase
"administrative supplies" in the ITO provisions may be argued to exclude
large capital expenditures, the overall legislative history seems to require
the term "governmental purposes" be broadly construed, thereby exempt-
ing state public works projects.
The questions "What is a commercial purpose?" and "What consti-
tutes goods and products used for the production of goods?" manifest
themselves in situations where there are proposed constructions of utilities
or highways. Does a city's charging for water or a state's collecting a high-
way toll tax constitute a commercial sale? Is the water a type of goods or
a treatment facility a product for use in the production of goods? In
Baldwin,6 ' a California district court held that the purchases of electrical
equipment used in generating electrical power were for "use in the pro-
duction of goods for sale"62 and therefore do not fit under the govern-
57 Supra note 4.
58 Supra note 41.
59 That provision read: "The provisions of this Artide shall not apply to the procurement
by governmental agencies of supplies for governmental use and not for resale (nor for use in
the production of goods for sale.)" See Hearings on Trade Agreement System and Proposed
International Trade Organization Charter Before the Senate Committee of Finance, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 339 (1947).
60 Id. at 339-340.
61 Supra note 53.
62 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
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mental purposes exception. The court went on to say: "Electricity is a
commodity which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported,
and sold."6' 3
The history of the governmental purposes exception indicates that a
reading broad enough to include public works projects which fall under
state buy-American statutes was originally intended. Thus, if a court
wishes to keep a state buy-American statute out of the exception clause
it must, as did Baldwin, liberally construe other words in the statute.
There were three main reasons for the original enactment of this sec-
tion of GATT: (1) to allow various countries to maintain a better balance
of payments, (2) for national security purposes, and (3) for the protec-
tion of local industry. 64 If a court is to decide a case on the basis of these
policies, the balance of payments and protectionist rationale, and in some
cases the security rationale, would dictate that state buy-American statutes
should fall within the exception. It is not altogether dear, however, that
our national policy is the same in regard to these matters as it was at the
establishment of GATT, especially in the area of protectionism. The ex-
ception clause seems to be an area now ripe for further executive or legis-
lative action. Until that action comes, the courts will continue to decide
on a case-by-case basis in line with their individual views and prejudices.
II. STATE "BUY-AMERICAN"
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION
Partially, as a result of the uncertainty surrounding GATT, the two
most recent cases concerning non-federal buy-American statutes were re-
solved on grounds other than GATT.
A. The Foreign Affairs Power
In Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Commissioners, 5 the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, which submitted bids for the construction of a California
public works project based on the use of American steel, filed two suits
against the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles.66
The relief sought was (1) an injunction prohibiting the award of the con-
tract to a bidder who did not comply with the California buy-American
Act, (2) a declaration that the Department must comply with the buy-
American Act in the future, and (3) damages. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in a consolidation of the two suits
631d.
64 Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT-Law and International Economic Organization, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago & London 1970, pp. 200-202.
6r 276 Cal. App.2d 221, 80 CaL Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969).
06 One suit was to enjoin the Department from performing a contract for the purchase of
steel, the other was to enjoin the performance of a contract for the construction of suspension
towers used for electrical transmission lines.
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and the court of appeals affirmed, holding the California buy-American
statute67 unconstitutional on the basis of its interfering with the federal
government's exclusive powers over foreign affairs.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"8 it was established
that the exclusive power of the federal government in the area of foreign
relations exists neither as a result of a specific constitutional delegation of
power"' nor as a delegation of power by the individual states, 70 but rather
as a "concomitant of nationality." 71 This proposition was based upon the
"irrefutable postulate that though the states were several, their people in
respect to foreign relations were one."72  Thus, if there is an actual con-
flict between state and federal laws in the area of foreign relations, the
national law will prevail. 7.
The court in Bethlehem did not find that the California buy-American
law was preempted by a federal law and therefore invalid,74 but found that
it was invalid because it interferred with a federal power which "whether
or not exercised, is exclusive in the field. ' 75 This proposition was partially
based on language found in Purdy v. Fitzpatrick,76 where the California
Supreme Court stated:
We need not await an instance of actual conflict to strike down a state
law which purports to regulate a subject matter which the Congress simul-
taneously aims to control. The opportunity for potential conflict is too
great to permit the operation of the state law.77
However, in Purdy, which dealt with the employment of aliens, a sec-
tion of the California Labor Code was invalidated because it "... . en-
croaches upon, and interferes with, a comprehensive regulatory scheme
enacted by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive power over immigra-
tion."78  There an actual conflict between federal and state laws did exist.
The Bethlehem court was on somewhat more solid ground when it re-
87 CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966).
8 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69id. at 318.
701 d. at 316.
71Id. at 318.
72 Id. at 317. See also, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) where it states:
... .in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear."
73United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
74 80 Cal. Rptr. n.8 at 804:
Our attention has been directed to the federal buy-American Act (47 Stat. 1520, as
amended in 63 Stat. 1024). This Act does not appear to be in direct conflict with the
California Act so as to preempt the latter. Conversely, the existence of the federal Act
cannot serve as justification for state legislation since, .. it is the sole province of the
federal government to act in this sphere....
75 Id. at n.9.
76 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 64 5(1969).
77 79 Cal. Rptr. at 84, 456 P.2d at 652.
78 79 Cal. Rptr. at 82, 456 P.2d at 650.
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lied on Zschernig v. Miller,79 to support its holding that the possibility
of conflict with a federal law is sufficient to invalidate state law. In
Zschernig the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon statute requiring
an alien heir to establish the actual existence of the right to the "benefit,
use or control" of inherited property under his country's domestic law
before he could take from the estate of a person dying in Oregon. A
broad reading of that case leads to the conclusion that statutes having
more than "... some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries . 8o
or affect "... international relations in a persistant and subtle way..
or having "... direct impact on foreign relations" 2 by impairing the ef-
fective exercises of foreign policy, are invalid. The California court con-
cluded that the state buy-American statute was invalid because it did have
a direct impact on foreign relations by virtue of possible retaliative protec-
tionist measures being taken by other countries against the United States. 83
The Bethlehem decision has been criticized on the ground that if fol-
lowed it would invalidate statutes representing valid state interests when-
ever those statutes affect the vaguely defined area of foreign affairs. "4 To
the extent the court maintains that a potential interference with uncertain
federal powers is enough to invalidate a state law, the criticism is well-
taken. However, the finding of the court that a state buy-American stat-
ute encroaches upon the ability of the federal government to carry out
foreign affairs seems to validate the decision in this particular class of state
legislation.85
B. The Commerce Power
The concurring opinion in Bethlehem by Justice Aiso suggests that the
79 389 U.S. 429 (1967).
So Id. at 434.
sl Id. at 440.
82 Id. at 441.
80 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
84 3 N.Y. 3. INT'f L. & POL. 164 at 171-172 (1970); 6 TBx. INT'L L FoRUM 134 at 140-
141 (1970).
85 1n Bethlehem, at 80 Cal. Rptr. 4, n.11, the court recognizes an editorial in the New
York Journal of Commerce dated Oct. 15, 1964 which reads in part:
Something of a dilemma confronts the present Administration and will also confront
any future administration in consequence of the urge that prompts many State Legis-
latures to enact measures that restrict the flow of international commerce within their
borders.... The nature of this delemma was suggested in a Washington dispatch to
this newspaper yesterday. In brief, its message was to the effect that Washington's
opportunity to win meaningful tariff concessions from foreign countries in the current
Kennedy Round may be much curtailed by "Buy American" or simply "Buy Local"
laws adapted in many states .... In the circumstances about the best we can hope is
that the State Legislatures will try harder in the future to temper the urge to protect
their own producers with realization that the cumulative effect of procurement re-
strictions among many states can produce impossible rigidities in national policy.
Even those who do not approve of the national foreign trade policy should realize
that if it is to be determined by the future policies of 50 different entities, there won't
be any policy at all.
1971]
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California buy-American statute could have been struck down by relying
on the power of the federal government to regulate foreign commerce.80
Many commentators have also suggested this approach in dealing with buy-
American statutes.87  The power of Congress to regulate foreign com-
merce extends to being able to ensure that no commercial barriers are
raised by the states. In Welton v. Missouri,88 the Supreme Court said:
"The commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be the
subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character.
That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from any bur-
dens imposed by reason of its foreign origin."89
The leading case in the area of state statutes regulating foreign com-
merce is Brown v. Maryland,9" where the Supreme Court struck down a
Maryland statute requiring importers of foreign goods to take out a license
costing fifty dollars. The Court held that such a regulation obstructed
the right of the federal government to control foreign commerce,0 ' al-
though it recognized that the state still possesses certain powers to regu-
late trade within its borders which may incidently regulate foreign trade
entering the state. The Court, however, declined to decide where the
powers of the state stop and those of the federal government begin be-
cause "like the intervening colours between white and black they approach
so nearly as to perplex the understanding as colours perplex the vision in
marking the distinction between them.1'9 2
Later courts have used more than one method to determine where to
draw the line between the right of a state to regulate trade within its
borders and the exclusive right of the federal government to control for-
eign commerce. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,93 the "national nature"
test was announced whereby the states were prohibited from exercising
their rights if the subject were such that it demanded a single uniform
policy in dealing with other nations.9 Later, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,95
the Court held that a federal regulation was supreme if (1) the regulation
is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room to supplement it, (2) if the federal interest is so dominant that the
86 80 Cal. Rptr. at 806. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, d. 3 confers upon the federal government
the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations."
8 7 Comment, California's Buy-American Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution,
17 STANFORD L. REv. 119, 132 (1964); Note, Constitutionality of Buy American Acts Under
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, 8 VA. J. IN'L 1. 151, 155 (1967); N.Y. J. INT'L L. &
PoL. 164, 172-173 (1970); 6 TEx. INT'L L FORuM 134, 141-142 (1970).
88 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
89 Id. at 282.
90 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1927).
91id. at 448.
921d. at 441.
93 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1885).
94Id. at 319.
95 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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federal system must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws sub-
ject, or (3) if the enforcement of the state law presents a serious danger
of conflict with the administration of the federal program. 6 Later cases
have held, in accordance with Brown, that state restrictions on foreign im-
ports infringe on the foreign commerce power of the federal government
and are therefore invalid. 7
There would be little difficulty in finding a state buy-American statute
invalid as against the commerce dause. In American Institute for Im-
ported Steel, 8 however, a New York court rejected this argument:
We must necessarily differentiate between the proprietary action of the
state and its acts which purport to regulate private transactions where it
[the government entityl attempts to regulate private transactions arbi-
trarily; this may well be a constitutional problem. However, when the
state acts in its proprietary capacity there can be none.99
In holding that the state in its proprietary capacity can regulate its own
transactions, the court relied heavily on People v. Crane,'1° decided in
1915, in which the New York Court of Appeals held that the state could
constitutionally exclude aliens from public works projects:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination, indeed, but not arbitrary discrimina-
tion; for the principle of the exclusion is the restriction of the resources
of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state.101
While the issue of the rights of aliens brings up many problems beyond
the scope of this note, it should be pointed out that in Purdy,1 1 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a state may not constitutionally enact
a statute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works projects. Purdy
also held that a state has no power in an area in which Congress has shown
the desire to regulate with a single national scheme. This approach
appears to be the best one and the one courts will adopt in the future.
The "proprietary interest" of a state should not be allowed to upset the
complex scheme of the federal government in the area of foreign com-
merce.
00id. See also Rice v. Cooley, 331 U.S. 218 (1947), where the court holds that the test
of applicability of a state's right to act is where the matter is io any way regulated by federal
law.
07 City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 331, 195 N.E.2d 916 (Franklin County
Mun. Ct. 1963); City of Columbus v. Miqdadi, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 195 NE.2d 923 (Frank-
lin County Mun. Ct. 1963).
08 58 Misc.2d 1059, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602 rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y.S. 60 (1969).
99297 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
100 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915).
1OlId, at 161, 108 N.E. 427 at 429.
102 Supra note 76.
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III. CONCLUSION
The state buy-American statutes are the result of a protectionist atti-
tude which was at one time dominant in the United States. Although
this attitude may be returning today, it is important that import restric-
tions be determined on a national level through the political process. If
the need arises there are even now methods the federal government can
use to regulate foreign imports, including anti-dumping laws and various
quota systems. Individual states, however, are neither equipped nor em-
powered to make this type of far-reaching decision concerning the direc-
tion of our foreign commerce. At least the commerce clause remains as
one legal means for striking down buy-American provisions. State and
federal courts have an obligation to use that route whenever possible to
eliminate state and local legislation affecting international commerce.
Robert L. Rothman
